Delay in Decisions of Anti-Defection Cases

• 03 Apr 2025

For Prelims: Supreme Court, Anti-defection, Article 142, Election Commission of India 

For Mains: Anti-Defection Law and its impact on Indian democracy, Role of the Speaker in disqualification cases,Judicial interpretations of the Anti-Defection Law 

Source:TH 

Why in News?  

A Supreme Court(SC) Bench has asserted that the judiciary is not “powerless” if a Legislative Speaker delays deciding anti-defection petitions under the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law) of the Constitution. 

• The remark came while hearing on pleas filed by a state political party, who sought judicial intervention against prolonged inaction by the state Assembly Speaker on disqualification petitions against Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) who defected to the ruling party. 

What is the Anti-defection Law? 

• About: The Anti-Defection Law (ADL) was introduced in 1985 through the 52nd Amendment Act, adding the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. It aims to curb opportunistic political defections by legislatures (Members of Parliament (MPs) and MLAs) to promote party discipline, and ensure stable governments. 
• Grounds for Disqualification: 
  • For Members of Political Parties: If a member voluntarily gives up their party membership. 
    • If a member votes or abstains contrary to the party’s whip without prior permission and the act is not condoned within 15 days. 
  • For Independent Members: Disqualified if they join a political party after the election. 
  • For Nominated Members: Disqualified if they join a political party after six months from taking their seat. 
• Exception: The ADL exempts the Presiding Officer or Speaker from disqualification if they voluntarily give up their party membership or rejoin it after ceasing to hold office. This provision is intended to ensure the dignity and impartiality of the role. 
  • A member is not disqualified if their party merges with another and at least two-thirds of its members agree to the merger. 
• Role of the Speaker: Under the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker acts as a quasi-judicial authority to decide on disqualification of defecting legislators. 
  • The law does not specify a deadline within which the Speaker must decide defection cases, leading to long delays in some instances. 
• Judicial Empowerment: Under Article 142, the SC can pass any order necessary for complete justice, including compelling constitutional authorities to act within a reasonable period. 
  • In the L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and Others (1997), the SC ruled that judicial remedies are available against tribunal orders. Since the Speaker functions as a tribunal in disqualification cases, the SC can issue directions, just as it does for other constitutional tribunals like the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). 

Judicial Pronouncements Regarding Anti-Defection 

• In Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu (1992), the SC upheld the Presiding Officer’s authority in defection cases, ruling it not unconstitutional and subject to judicial review. 
• In Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India (1994), the SC held that "voluntarily giving up membership" does not require a formal resignation and can be inferred from a legislator’s conduct. 
• In Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020), the SC ruled that the Speaker must decide defection cases within a reasonable time (preferably within 3 months). 

How Does the Delay in Disqualification Affect Governance? 

• Democratic Undermining: Delay enables defectors to continue in office, potentially distorting the popular mandate. This undermines the purpose of the Tenth Schedule, rendering it functionally ineffective. 
• Political Morality: Erodes public trust in democratic institutions and promotes a culture of political opportunism and horse trading (buying and selling of political support). 
• Governance Paralysis: Affects policymaking and weakens opposition voices when defectors align with the ruling party. 
  • Case Study: Maharashtra (2022) delay in disqualification proceedings by the Speaker allowed power shifts and instability. 
• Electoral Accountability: Delay in decision-making stalls re-elections and deprives voters of their democratic right to choose representatives aligned with their mandate. 
• Exploited by Ruling Parties: Delay in action often benefits ruling party interests, especially when the Speaker belongs to the same party.  
  • Allows ruling parties to consolidate power through engineered defections. 

What Reforms Are Needed to Strengthen the Anti-Defection Law? 

• Statutory Time Limit for Decisions: As recommended by the SC (Keisham Meghachandra, 2020) , a time-bound framework (e.g., 90 days) should be introduced for Speakers to decide on disqualification petitions to prevent indefinite delays. 
• Adjudication Powers to Independent Authority: Shift decision-making from the Speaker to an external, neutral tribunal or the Election Commission of India. 
  • The 2^nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) recommended that disqualification on defection grounds should be decided by the President/Governor based on the Election Commission's advice. 
• Limit Scope of Party Whip: Restrict whip enforcement to confidence motions, and money bills and allow legislators to exercise conscience-based voting on policy issues without fear of disqualification. 
• Encourage Political Ethics: Encourage consultative decision-making and allow dissent within political parties to reduce the need for legislators to switch parties over ideological or policy differences. 

Drishti Mains Question: 

How does the delay in anti-defection cases affect governance and electoral accountability? Suggest measures to ensure time-bound decisions.

UPSC Civil Services Examination, Previous Year Questions (PYQ) 

Prelims:

Q. Which one of the following Schedules of the Constitution of India contains provisions regarding anti-defection? (2014)

(a) Second Schedule 
(b) Fifth Schedule 
(c) Eighth Schedule 
(d) Tenth Schedule 

Ans: (d)

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Mains: 

Q. The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law which was legislated but with a different intention? (2013)

Q. ‘Once a Speaker, Always a Speaker’! Do you think this practice should be adopted to impart objectivity to the office of the Speaker of Lok Sabha? What could be its implications for the robust functioning of parliamentary business in India? (2020)